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Abstract 
The present study investigated the effects of three factors on the level of realism in frequency 
judgements. These factors were: Instruction (No correction for guessing/Correction for 
guessing), Format (whether the frequency judgements were made in terms of absolute numbers 
or in percent) and Difficulty level (easy/hard set of questions). All three factors were found to 
have a significant effect on the level of the frequency judgements and their realism. In addition, 
there were no interaction effects. The results suggest that the level and the realism of frequency 
judgements are both affected by different factors. Correction for guessing improved the realism 
in frequency judgements, however, only on the set of easy questions and markedly only in the 
relative format.  
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Does correction for guessing improve the realism in 
absolute and relative frequency judgements? 
       Confidence and frequency judgements are part of what cognitive psychologists refer to as 
metacognition. In short, a confidence judgement is a statement about how sure one is that the 
answer one has selected to a question is correct and a frequency judgement is a statement about 
how many questions in a test one believes to have answered correctly. Metacognition is usually 
described as encompassing both knowledge about one’s cognitive abilities and regulation of 
processes that coordinate cognition, in short, cognition about cognition (Fernandez-Duque, 
Baird, & Posner, 2000; Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993; Koriat, 2000; Shimamura, 2000).  
       To illustrate, Nelson (1996) described some metacognitive components in connection to 
learning and distinguished between control and monitoring components. During the acquisition 
phase the key metacognitive control components are the selection of a strategy as to which 
mnemonic processing is best suited for the task and the allocation of study time. The key 
metacognitive monitoring components are an assessment of previous knowledge, a judgement of 
learning concerning how well the material has been memorized and judgements of confidence for 
material retrieved from memory, that is, how sure one is that the retrieved answer is correct.  
       In this context it is interesting to note the parallel to the emerging cognitive neuroscience of 
metacognition (Banich, 1997). Shimamura (2000) has suggested that “…there is considerable 
convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working memory and 
frontal lobe function” (p. 313).  
       There are several other types of judgements that can be labelled metacognitive, for instance 
information-based judgements of the extent of one’s knowledge (Allwood & Granhag, 1996a; 
Rozenblit & Keil, 2002), experience-based judgements (i.e. an immediate “gut feeling”) (Koriat, 
2000; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2000) and judgements based on the distinction between recollection 
and familiarity which has some relation to the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon, which can be seen 
as an example of the feeling of knowing (Dodson & Schacter, 2002; Koriat, 2000, Yonelinas, 
2001, 2002).  
       One aspect of metacognitive judgements is that they can be more or less valid, that is, realistic 
compared to some objective criterion (e.g. an agreed upon answer). There are several quite 
different accounts of which factors affect the realism in people’s confidence judgements (for 
overviews, see Allwood & Granhag, 1999; Keren, 1991; Lichtenstein, Fischoff, & Phillips, 1982; 
McClelland & Bolger, 1994; Suantak, Bolger, & Ferrell, 1996).  
       One reasonable assumption is that people’s metacognition is influenced by a multitude of 
factors, for instance anchoring (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Scheck, Meeter, & Nelson, 2004; 
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Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), bias (Mussweiler & Neumann, 2000); problem representation 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1996), problematizing (Allwood, 1995) and self-evaluation (Dunning, 
Johnson, Ehrlinger & Kruger, 2003; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). In the present study I investigate 
the influence of some different factors on the level of realism in frequency judgements. 
       In the last decades there have been forthcoming several empirically based accounts of 
different processes that have been shown to affect metacognitive judgements. Some of these are 
social factors (Johansson, 2004), rule-based versus exemplar-based processing (Juslin & Olsson, 
2004), heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), ecological rationality (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003) 
and a multitude of other factors as, for instance, type of feedback, type of confidence judgement 
and the temporal relation between task, decision and outcome (Allwood & Granhag, 1999). 
Concerning the specifics of frequency judgements, (also called aggregated-item judgements, 
Treadwell & Nelson, 1996; and global judgements, Liberman, 2004; Sniezek & Buckley, 1991) 
there has been much less research. 
       The main finding within this latter research is the confidence-frequency effect which means that 
when confidence judgements of answers to general knowledge questions (hereafter GKQs) result 
in overconfidence then frequency judgements typically result in good realism, and when 
confidence judgements show good realism then frequency judgements typically show 
underconfidence. There are only few explanations why this effect occurs. For example, Sniezek 
and Buckley (1991) proposed a dual-process account which states that confidence and frequency 
judgements are made with reference to different considerations. They propose that item-specific 
confidence judgements may be affected by memory (i.e. memory-cues and memory distortions) 
and memory processes such as the distinction between recollection and familiarity and item-
specific considerations whereas frequency judgements likely are influenced by considerations of 
one’s expertise, previous task performances and so forth. 
       Liberman (2004) has suggested that the confidence-frequency effect can be diminished and 
manipulated depending on what instructions the participants in different experimental conditions 
receive. He presented empirical support for his hypothesis that when making a frequency 
judgement participants do not consider that on all items they claimed they were guessing, they 
may be expected to be correct on half of them just by chance and should incorporate this in their 
frequency judgement.  
 
Research questions within the field of metacognitive judgements 
Before we turn our attention to the specifics of investigating what factors affects the realism in 
frequency judgements I will present a general background. Several lines of research within 
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psychology such as judgement and decision making, learning and memory research come 
together under the concept of metacognition and influence the tradition of what is called 
calibration research. The specific focus within calibration research is on how well people’s subjective 
confidence and frequency judgements conform to an objective measure of their memory or 
knowledge statements.  
       Studies of calibration have shown that people’s confidence often exceeds their accuracy. 
Overconfidence is common, albeit not universal, since it can be reversed for easy questions. (For 
reviews of the literature, see Keren, 1991; Lichtenstein et al., 1982, McClelland & Bolger, 1994). 
This phenomenon, called the difficulty effect or the hard-easy effect, is the typical finding that 
increasing overconfidence often co-varies with increasing task difficulty or lower proportions of 
correct answers to GKQs. Incidentally, in contrast to this, underconfidence (i.e. being less 
confident than correct) has been observed for perceptual tasks such as sensory discrimination 
(Juslin & Olsson, 1997; Juslin, Winman, & Olsson, 2003; Olsson & Juslin, 2000). The main 
challenge facing theories and models of calibration is to explain these effects. 
       Another facet of metacognition concerns memory research. Numerous multiple-memory 
systems have been proposed over the years such as, to name a few, declarative memory versus 
procedural memory, explicit versus implicit memory, episodic versus semantic memory and 
working memory versus reference memory (Banich, 1997; Galotti, 1999; Kellogg, 1995).  
       The distinction sometimes made in memory research between remembering and knowing is 
assumed to tap into the different parts of the episodic and semantic memory systems. This 
distinction of remembering versus knowing also designates the difference between recollection 
and familiarity which are argued to be two separate processes that underlie recognition memory 
and there is sometimes an opposition relationship between familiarity and item-specific memory 
as when people see a familiar test item but fail to remember more specific information about it 
(Dodson & Schacter, 2002; Yonelinas, Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal, & King, 1996). One could 
reasonably argue that when people are engaged in tasks that require them to make confidence 
and frequency judgements they make reference to different parts of their memory systems as in 
Sniezek and Buckley’s (1991) dual-process account mentioned earlier. In this work I used 
declarative general knowledge tasks which could be affected by both of the above mentioned 
processes.  
       In general, research on metacognition by cognitive scientists and neurobiologists can help 
produce a “…synergy between the psychological and philosophical approaches to consciousness, 
by furnishing constraints on the range of acceptable theories and by providing clues to inspire 
new theories” (Nelson, 1996, p. 103). We have come a long way since the 19th century 
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philosopher Comte formulated his famous paradox; “The thinker cannot divide himself into two, 
of whom one reasons whilst the other observes him reason. The organ observed and the organ 
observing being, in this case, identical, how could such observation take place?” (quoted in 
Nelson, 1996, p. 104). One way to dissolve this paradox of self-reference was developed by the 
mathematician and logician Alfred Tarski who came up with the idea of the meta concept which 
is a level up from the object level and is in some sense separable from the object level it refers to 
(Popper, 1963, 1990). His solution was that no sentence could refer to itself. His theory of truth 
made use of semantics to inform logic but the same reasoning applied to consciousness informs 
us that at the object-level there are cognitions about for instance external objects and at the meta-
level there are cognitions concerning cognitions of those external objects. They are two possibly 
different processes that could occur simultaneously but may occur on different levels. However, 
the exact meaning of “level” has often been left unspecified. In spite of this, today, this 
distinction has been a useful heuristic and has been further differentiated in for instance research 
on the neural bases of consciousness and metacognition (Freeman, 1999) and it has also been 
used to introduce new theories about the workings of the mind (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2000; 
Schooler, 2002).  
       The different lines of research concerning metacognition briefly delineated above illustrate 
that there are many factors intertwined in calibration research. How to tease them apart or 
understand how they interact when forming a metacognitive judgement is no easy task for the 
researcher.  
 
The aim and scope of this paper 
The aim of this work is to achieve an improved understanding of some of the factors that affect 
frequency judgements. As noted above, previous research has often found that frequency 
judgements are given at a lower level than item specific confidence judgements. One recent 
explanation of this effect is attempted by Liberman (2004) who presented empirical evidence for 
that the level of frequency judgements can approach the level of confidence judgements if the 
participants were given instructions to incorporate a correction for random guessing. I wanted to 
see if this effect can be replicated in the present study.  
       Furthermore, it has been suggested in a previous study by Brenner, Koehler, Liberman, and 
Tversky (1996) that relative frequency judgements (i.e., answers given as percentage correct of a 
set), as compared with absolute frequency judgements (i.e., answers given in natural numbers) 
might exhibit overestimation. The researchers mentioned did not actually perform an experiment 
to investigate if this actually is true. I wanted to find out if that suggestion holds with respect to 
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frequency judgements. Finally, I investigate if the level of difficulty of the questions answered has 
a significant effect on the level of frequency judgements and on their realism. In brief, this study 
investigates if certain conditions may have a conducive effect on frequency judgements so they 
approach the actual accuracy of answers given. 
 
Theories and models of calibration  
As mentioned above, the main challenge facing theories and models of calibration is to provide 
an explanation to the overconfidence effect, the hard-easy effect (Juslin et al., 2000; Keren, 1991; 
Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Lichtenstein et al., 1982; McClelland & Bolger, 
1994; Suantak et al., 1996) and more recently, the confidence-frequency effect (Brenner et al., 
1996; Griffin & Buehler, 1999; Treadwell & Nelson, 1996). Over the years numerous theoretical 
accounts and models have been developed to explain these effects. This section is intended as a 
selective overview to provide the reader with the core assumptions of some of the major models 
of calibration and how their explanations differ concerning the overconfidence and the hard-easy 
effect. Note that only some of the models also provide an explanation of the confidence-
frequency effect which will be dealt with later when I present previous research on frequency 
judgements. 
       At least since the 90’ies, there have been two major camps in calibration research, each with 
“a radically different view” (McClelland & Bolger, 1994, p. 455) as to where the locus of the 
observed biases in calibration should be located. One camp has largely put it within the 
individual. The most representative members of this internalist or subjectivist camp are Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky. In propounding their “heuristics and biases program” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) they have provided numerous demonstrations of the apparent irrationality of 
individuals when they engage in probabilistic reasoning and making judgements under 
uncertainty. Kahneman and Tversky have said that their research results are discouraging for 
those who “… wish to view man as a reasonable intuitive statistician” (cited in Goldman, 1986, 
p. 305). Several other researchers (e.g. Keren, 1991) have similarly built their explanations on one 
or more internal heuristics to explain the relationship between difficulty and 
over/underconfidence.  
       Keren (1991) suggested that participants use the “anchor and adjust” heuristic on a 
probability estimate reflecting intermediate difficulty (75 %) on GKQs in a two-alternative forced 
choice (2AFC) task. According to this account, participants do not expect a task that is so 
difficult that performance will be on a chance level nor do they expect a task that is so easy that 
performance will be near perfect. If an item is perceived to be very easy or very hard one would 
 11
adjust accordingly from the preconceived anchor of intermediate difficulty, but not sufficiently 
and this would explain under- or overconfidence. Exactly how participants would make these 
adjustments is not outlined by the author. 
       In contrast to the internalists, the other camp might be called the externalists in that they 
have argued that the locus of bias in the main is found outside the cognitive system of the 
individual. The person who most forcefully has put forward arguments against the internalist 
view is, according to McClelland and Bolger (1994), Gerd Gigerenzer. He has made the claim 
that “biases in probabilistic reasoning are essentially artifacts” (McClelland & Bolger, 1994, p. 
456), built into the tests by using a non-representative sampling of questions which is termed 
“misleading tasks”. It should be noted that this explanation is in itself troublesome. First of all it’s 
not obvious what items should be included or excluded to constitute a well-specified reference-
class. Secondly, the argument against the use of non-representative items assumes that people 
have similar general background knowledge since the use of representative items in itself is 
argued to be enough to make the hard-easy effect disappear. 
       Gigerenzer (McClelland & Bolger, 1994) has also argued that people’s probabilistic 
representations are in a frequentist format and not formed according to Bayes’ rule. This will be 
explicated further below. For now it suffices to say that Cosmides and Tooby (1996) made a 
series of studies that showed, somewhat surprisingly, that people perhaps are good intuitive 
statisticians conforming to Bayes’ rule after all, as long as the nature of the problem is presented 
in a frequentist format! This is an example of, as research has progressed, the above distinction 
between the internalist and the externalist has been blurred, which can be noticed in some 
models and accounts of probability judgements in that they are able to accommodate a wider 
range of phenomena as in for instance Support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994). 
       In short, Suantak et al. (1996) has pinpointed four factors that have been used to explain the 
hard-easy effect which is just mentioned briefly as a mnemonic device for the reader since they 
will be further delineated in connection to the various models presented in the next sections.  
       The hard-easy effect (1) is due to bias as in lack of attention to the quality or weight of 
evidence or disconfirming evidence rather than sensitivity to task difficulty as in the strength and 
weight model, (2) is due to response criteria in which respondent’s lack of information about the 
difficulty of the task prevents them to adjust to varying degrees of difficulty as Keren suggested 
(3) is a stimulus selection artefact in which the usually reported overconfidence should, according 
to the ecological models, disappear when questions are representative of a given reference class 
and(4) is mainly due to statistical error. However, Klayman et al. (1999) have shown how one 
may separate systematic psychological effects from statistical effects and still find systematic 
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differences between confidence judgements and accuracy such as the often found hard-easy 
effect and the typical overconfidence phenomenon. 
 
Internalist models 
       The stage model 
In 1980 Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischoff (described in McClelland & Bolger, 1994) presented a 
three-stage model of the cognitive processes involved in answering 2AFC GKQs to make a 
confidence judgement. First, memory is searched for relevant information and an answer is 
chosen, secondly one assesses the evidence to arrive at a feeling of certainty and thirdly this 
feeling is transposed to a numerical estimate. Koriat et al. suggested that overconfidence might 
result because of less than perfect processing in any of the three stages.  
       In the first stage a person might be biased in how they elicit knowledge, perhaps by 
favouring positive evidence. In the second stage individuals might have a tendency to disregard 
evidence inconsistent with the chosen answer and this would lead to overconfidence. In the last 
stage there could possibly occur a mistranslation of the feeling of certainty when transforming it 
to a numerical value. The authors themselves found some, empirical support for their model 
whereas subsequent research has not been able to replicate these findings (e.g. Allwood & 
Granhag, 1996b). Despite the lack of empirical support for their model it is useful when viewed 
as a framework where other models of calibration can, at least partly, be positioned as has been 
suggested by McClelland and Bolger (1994). For example, the process model (described next) can 
be located at the first stage, the strength and weight model (next after that) explains 
miscalibration as occurring in the first and second stages and so forth. 
 
       The process model 
As outlined by McClelland and Bolger (1994) this model was developed by R. S. May in 1986 and 
“contain many interesting and novel ideas, some of which were taken up in the later ecological 
models” (p. 468). She suggested that miscalibration was a consequence of the specific 
background knowledge possessed by different individuals, of the type of task performed and the 
selection of items within the tasks. Concerning GKQs May suggested two possible ways, or types 
of mental models, in which a person’s knowledge could be internally represented.  
       The first mental model is in the form of syllogisms where the individual uses inference to 
choose between the two alternatives in a 2AFC item. If presented with the following question 
“Which country has more inhabitants? (a) Sweden, (b) Netherlands.” May proposed that an 
individual might reason along the following lines; usually the larger the country the more 
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inhabitants in it, Sweden has a much larger area and is therefore more likely to have more 
inhabitants. On this basis, the individual would choose Sweden as the correct answer. Note that 
the individuals’ confidence judgement would be a function of her/his knowledge of nations and 
their respective sizes and populations and other possible background knowledge. May argued that 
if the items were randomly sampled from representative selections of nations then good 
calibration would be expected, but if there are many items which are “misleading”, that is, items 
for which the inference would produce the wrong answer (as in the example above), then 
overconfidence would occur.  
       The second mental model is in the form of a cognitive map. This type of knowledge 
representation could be used to answer a question like “Which city is further north? (a) Rome,  
(b) New York.” May showed that confidence was highly correlated with the distortions of 
individuals’ cognitive maps. In other words, the subjective distance between the cities would 
determine the answer and the respective confidence given, not the objective geographical 
relationship.  
       This second mental model has received substantial support in subsequent research in 
neuropsychology and has been referred to as a part of “The ‘where’ dorsal visual system for 
spatial processing” (Banich, 1997, p. 204). However, May was clearly wrong, as has been shown 
by subsequent research (e.g. Brenner et al., 1996), that perfect calibration always and only results 
in the absence of “misleading” items.  
 
       The strength and weight model 
As Johansson (2004) amply put it in his description of Griffin and Tversky’s 1992 article on the 
realism in confidence judgements, “…they resort to two concepts, strength and weight” (p. 10). 
Even though these concepts lack rigid definitions, by “…strength they mean the ‘extremeness’ of 
available evidence and by weight the ‘predictive validity’ of the evidence” (McClelland & Bolger, 
1994, p. 463). In short, Griffin and Tversky argue that overconfidence results when individuals 
excessively rely on the strength of evidence with simultaneous insufficient adjustment to its 
weight. As an example, individuals may use the representativeness heuristic when judging if they 
should trust what, for instance, a lawyer is saying by attending to how confident he or she seems 
whilst ignoring other factors, such as degree of experience this lawyer has in a hypothesized case. 
In a similar vein, underconfidence results when strength is lower than weight. They also 
hypothesize that individuals make use of the anchor-and-adjust heuristic but usually when 
adjusting to the weight of evidence they fail to adjust sufficiently. Tversky further expounded on 
these ideas together with Koehler with whom he developed Support theory, described next. 
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       Support theory 
Developed by Tversky and Koehler (1994), this is probably the broadest model since it tries to 
accommodate a wider range of phenomena than those specifically studied in calibration research, 
such as ordinal judgements and assessment of upper and lower probabilities. The basic features 
of the model have been extended further in “local-weight models for decomposition of evidential 
support” by Brenner and Koehler (1999) and Brenner’s (2003) “random support model” which 
focuses on the realism in confidence judgements. To avoid the fine-grained technicalities of the 
latter models I restrict myself to the basic premises of the general support theory. 
       In order to get the “feel” of support theory I will relate an example that Tversky and 
Koehler use to illustrate what they suggest is representative of an essential feature of human 
judgement. In a study by Fischoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (mentioned in Tversky & Koehler, 
1994) they asked car mechanics to figure out the probabilities of different causes why a car 
wouldn’t start. They had a main hypothesis, called the focal hypothesis, but the interesting part is 
that they found that the mean probability assigned to the residual hypothesis, “The cause of 
failure is something other than the battery, the fuel system, or the engine”, increased from .22 to 
.44 when the residual hypothesis was unpacked into more specific causes, e.g., the ignition 
system. Even though the participants were experienced car mechanics and could reasonably be 
assumed to be aware of these possibilities, the point is that they discounted the hypotheses not 
explicitly mentioned. 
       This was used by Tversky and Koehler (1994) to form a basic premise of support theory, 
namely, “…probability judgements are attached not to events but to descriptions of events”  
(p. 549). The example above illustrates that the very same hypothesis could be associated with 
varying degrees of confidence, depending on its description or simply because it’s made salient, 
which in turn influences the balance of support given to the focal hypothesis and its alternative. 
Similarly to Griffin and Tversky’s strength and weight model described above, support is defined 
as the strength of the evidence which could be based on known objective data on actual 
frequencies of the occurrence of some event or on the subjective memories of the person trying 
to evaluate the alternative hypotheses. These recollections are further “…mediated by 
judgemental heuristics, such as representativeness, availability or anchoring and adjustment” 
(Tversky & Koehler, 1994, p. 549). Support could also be mediated by reasoning and arguments. 
It seems that support theory can incorporate many of the facets expounded by the other models 
mentioned previously.  
       What most models mentioned so far share is their “internalist” stance that explains 
overconfidence and the hard-easy effect in terms of different biases or distortions and less than 
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perfect processing of information. They also present a rather bleak picture of the human being as 
being rather poor in adjusting to changing realities. Several training programs designed to 
overcome these biases reported in the literature have only reported modest improvements and 
the improvements they do report do not seem to generalize from one knowledge domain to 
another (Allwood & Granhag, 1999; Keren, 1991; Lichtenstein et al., 1982). 
 
Externalist models 
The ecological models draw on the ideas by May described above and suggest explanations in 
terms of biased, non-representational selection of items typically used in general knowledge tasks. 
The error models, on the other hand, suggest explanations in terms of regression effects due to 
random error components. These two perspectives have been brought together in several hybrid 
ecological/error models (e.g. Juslin et al., 2003; Soll, 1996; Suantak et al., 1996). The internalist 
models (Thurstonian) and the ecological models (Brunswikian) have been referred to as being on 
either side of a distinction between two modes of uncertainty which have been inspired by 
“…two of the great probabilists in the history of psychology, namely L. L. Thurstone and Egon 
Brunswik” (Juslin & Olsson, 1997, p. 345).  
 
       Ecological models 
Thurstonian uncertainty is described as being located inside us humans much in the same sense 
that has been delineated by the internalist models presented earlier (e.g. the stage model, the 
process model). In contrast to this, Brunswikian uncertainty is external in the sense that 
judgement errors and faulty decisions arise due to less than perfect correlations between 
subjectively known data and uncertain aspects of the world. This means that no improvement in 
the reliability of our information processing system can alleviate this source of error.  
       Inspired by Brunswik, and independently of each other, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and 
Kleinbölting, 1991 and Juslin, 1994 (reported in McClelland & Bolger, 1994) produced 
remarkably similar ecological models. The basic assumptions of these models are that people are 
seen as (1) well adapted to their environments, (2) they accurately and with little conscious effort 
store information regarding the frequency of occurrence of events and (3) these stored 
frequencies are the basis for probability or confidence judgements. Thus Brunswiks’ notion of 
people as “intuitive statisticians” means that people are frequentists.  
       If we use the same example as mentioned on page 12 in connection to the process model 
and suppose that a person tries to figure out which country has the larger population then, 
according to the ecological models, the reasoning might be along the following lines. A person 
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uses all European countries as the proper reference class and the populations of the same 
countries as the target variable. To help the person make a choice between the presented 
alternatives a probability cue must be used. This is defined as a variable related to the target 
variable, as in this example “larger countries tend to have larger populations”. If this fails another 
cue might be generated. The ecological models claim that if one compares the sizes and 
populations of all European countries in pairs, the ecological validity of this particular cue would 
be, perhaps 0.7. That means that it would work on 70 % of the occasions. They further assume 
that these ecological validities are cognitively represented in the individual as cue validities which 
they report conform to the reported confidence judgements, if, and this is important, the task is 
representative of a defined reference class. They argue that overconfidence is simply an effect of 
an informal selection of general knowledge tasks that are non-representative of the reference 
class in the environment.  
       Another prediction of these models is that if two sets of items, hard and easy, are generated 
from the same sampling process then the hard-easy effect should disappear. An investigation into 
this matter done in 1996 concluded that the ecological model’s explanation of the hard-easy 
effect “…is falsified by the experimental results and analysis we have presented” (Suantak et al., 
1996, p. 219). Suantak et al. (1996) also stated that “…the concept of objective cue validities as a 
basis for subjective probability judgements is fundamentally ambiguous” (p. 220). Note that 
informally selected, but previously used, items were used in the experiment in this paper. 
However, Cosmides and Tooby (1996) have shown that when using the “medical diagnosis 
problem” (see Appendix A) the often reported cognitive biases such as “base-rate neglect”, 
“overconfidence” and “conjunction fallacy” tend to disappear if the problem is expressed in a 
frequentist representation.  
 
       Error models 
The proponents of the importance of the role of statistical errors in the data of calibration 
research have argued that overconfidence and the hard-easy effect may more or less disappear if 
one controls for scale-end effects and regression effects in the data (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 
1994; Juslin et al., 2000; Soll, 1996). Erev et al. (1994) exemplifies the role of error using three 
constructs: true judgement, an error distribution and a response rule. A true judgement, T, is the 
likelihood of choosing the correct answer in a 2AFC task i. Ti is estimated from 0 to 1 and 
assumed to be influenced by random error e. The degree of subjective confidence is translated 
into a numerical confidence judgement r. Thus we have ri = f (Ti + e).  
 17
       Erev et al. (1994) further proposed that, “…on the very reasonable assumption that 
judgements have an error component associated with them, the possibility exists that the 
phenomena of over- and underconfidence are often or primarily statistical consequences of how 
the data have been analyzed” (p. 523). However, they are not saying that overconfidence is 
necessarily or entirely statistical artefacts. The position they are arguing for is that the relation 
between subjective probability and actual accuracy in a particular context “…needs to be 
established after controlling for random factors in judgement or response” (Erev et al., p. 523). 
Juslin et al. (2000) came to a similar conclusion. 
 
Recent developments 
The models briefly described above still exert considerable influence on present day research in 
several ways. Many of the core ideas about how to explain miscalibration in individuals are built 
upon and further refined to explain a wider range of data. A major challenge facing the 
researchers who want to develop a “new” model is that they need to be able to explain precisely 
the phenomena which were inexplicable by the earlier models. 
       The ecological rationality research program presented next is an attempt to explain several of 
the cognitive biases identified in previous research, not solely by internal processes, but rather in 
connection with their ecological rationality, that is, their being useful adaptations to the 
environment.  
 
       Ecological rationality research program 
In 2003 Todd and Gigerenzer presented a research program for studying simple decision 
heuristics inspired by H. A. Simon’s ideas about human rationality. In 1981 Simon proposed 
(reported in Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003) that human rationality is constrained by two unrelated 
sets of bounds, external (e.g. the cost of search for information) and internal (memory constraints 
or information processing speed). In this research program these sets of bounds are seen as 
related and “may fit together like blades in a pair of scissors” (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003, p. 143). 
From this perspective the internal bounds of the cognitive system can be shaped, for instance by 
evolution, to take advantage of the structure of the environment. In this sense, human beings 
exhibit ecological rationality and make good enough decisions by exploiting the external information 
structures in the environment. The authors argue that this is a rather positive view on the human 
being as a decision maker in contrast to other researchers who portray humans as suffering from 
cognitive illusions, irrationality and being cognitive misers unable to adapt to varying 
circumstances.  
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       Todd and Gigerenzer (2003) claim that “…less information and processing can actually 
enable greater accuracy than more in some cases.” (p. 145). This is probably counterintuitive to 
many but the authors report some studies where experts (they don’t mention what type of 
experts) have been shown to base their judgements on “surprisingly few pieces of information” 
(Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003, p. 154). Hence their focus on “fast and frugal heuristics”.  
       The authors propose that there are many different types of heuristics that are thought to 
make up parts of what they term the adaptive toolbox. This is seen as a collection of specialized 
cognitive mechanisms such as search for information, stopping-rules for search and decision-
making that evolution and learning have built into the human mind. The building blocks of this 
adaptive toolbox may be put together to form a variety of fast and frugal heuristics and next we 
briefly outline one of them which, according to the authors, have received most attention. 
       Ignorance-based decision making. Some simple heuristics actually rely on a lack of knowledge to 
make appropriate decisions. For instance, the recognition heuristic can be used to recognize faces 
or names but lack of recognition can also be used in making a decision. If there are many items 
one doesn’t recognize and therefore is ignorant of, Todd and Gigerenzer (2003) suggests that one 
disregards those items and simply chooses what one recognizes. These heuristics work in parallel.   
       This has been experimentally tested in relation to making an investment portfolio on the 
stock market. Laypersons where asked to form a portfolio based on ten companies they 
recognized and their portfolios were compared to professional fund managers. In this experiment 
done in 1996-1997 by Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann and Gigerenzer (cited in Todd & Gigerenzer, 
2003) the ignorance-driven recognition heuristic outperformed highly trained fund managers who 
used all available information, as well as randomly formed portfolios, which sometimes beat the 
experts. 
       The authors argue that by studying ecological rationality one may “go beyond the widespread 
fiction that basing decision making on more information and computation will always lead to 
more accurate inferences” (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003, p. 160). They give an example concerning 
children’s language acquisition where the cognitive limitations actually seem beneficial.  
       The restrictions of the developing mind enables accurate learning of only a fraction of the 
environment, which then provides a scaffold to guide subsequent learning about the environment 
in an adaptive way. In sum, the above account argues that simple heuristics have a selective 
advantage over more complex cognitive strategies. This does not mean that humans don’t use 
more complex cognitive processes, but under many circumstances it might be more beneficial or 
cost-effective to use some simpler rules of thumb one has learnt to rely on. 
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       Multi-factorial, multi-level open systems model? 
This is mainly a theoretical construct, but based on conclusions drawn from reviewing lots of 
empirical studies. It could be viewed as a “presumably false yet formally highly probable non-
empirical statement” (Popper, 1963, p. 336). At this point I would like to make a digression 
which will serve as a major point that I would like to make in connection with making models 
and building theories.  
       I think it’s virtually impossible to construct a grand general model that is able to explain a 
wide range of empirical phenomena over many domains of knowledge. It is much more likely 
that one succeeds in formulating a theory and a model which is more limited in scope, defined to 
accommodate a range of phenomena in a well specified domain and this could probably be done 
to a higher degree of accuracy. I base this on Popper’s studies of the contents of theories which 
he contrasts with the calculus of probability. To illustrate how informative content in a theory 
stands in opposition to the probability of the same theory Popper (1963) has given the following 
example: 
 
Let a be the statement “It will rain on Friday”, b the statement “It will be fine on Saturday” 
and ab the statement “It will rain on Friday and it will be fine on Saturday”: it is then 
obvious that the informative content of this last statement, the conjunction ab, will exceed 
that of its component a and also that of its component b. And it will also be obvious that 
the probability of ab (or, what is the same, the probability that ab will be true) will be 
smaller than that of either of its components. Writing Ct (a), for “the content of statement 
a”, and Ct (ab) for “the content of the conjunction a and b”, we have 
(1)                                                   Ct (a) < Ct (ab) > Ct (b). 
This contrasts with the corresponding law of the calculus of probability, 
(2)                                                     p (a) > p (ab) < p (b) 
where the inequality signs of (1) are inverted. Together these two laws, (1) and (2), state 
that with increasing content, probability decreases and vice versa, or in other words, that 
content increases with increasing improbability. (…) 
       This trivial fact has the following inescapable consequences: if growth of knowledge 
means that we operate with theories of increasing content, it must also mean that we 
operate with theories of decreasing probability (in the sense of the calculus of probability). 
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Thus if our aim is the advancement or growth of knowledge, then a high probability (in 
the sense of the calculus of probability) cannot possibly be our aim as well: these two aims are 
incompatible. (p. 295). 
 
       Here it’s interesting to note that, in line with Popper, Allwood and Granhag (1999) has not 
suggested a theory or model but pointed out a multitude of factors that reasonably could affect 
confidence judgements under real-life circumstances and factually affect people in several 
professions. They have further argued against the notion that few-factor models adequately can 
accommodate a wide range of phenomena found in calibration research. Allwood and Granhag 
have analyzed a substantial part of previous articles on the subject and, based on that, presented a 
list of factors (selected from Table 7.2 on page 134) which may influence realism in confidence 
judgements: type of confidence judgement (retrospective vs. predictions; item-specific vs. 
frequency), type of knowledge (semantic, episodic, procedural, implicit), number of alternatives 
(one vs. many), type of elicitation (spontaneous vs. instructed), number of persons (individual vs. 
group), degree of experience (low vs. high), cost for search of information (low vs. high), 
temporal relation between task and decision (short vs. long), temporal relation between decision 
and outcome (short vs. long), stability of environment (low vs. high), feedback (yes vs. no), type 
of feedback (clear vs. ambiguous) and delivery of feedback (immediate vs. delayed). If one 
compares this list of factors with the explanations given by the previously mentioned models how 
to explain the lack of realism often found in calibration research one can immediately see that 
these models have only used a very limited number of factors. The message by Allwood and 
Granhag is that “no few-factor theory will do on a general level” (p. 142).  
       In a study by Jonsson and Allwood (2003) they further qualified the above mentioned 
message that it is especially true if distal and global factors are considered. These factors include, 
for instance, knowledge domain, gender and cognitive style. Proximal factors, such as the type of 
cognitive processes leading to a confidence judgement, could be affected by distal factors such as 
knowledge domain and cognitive style. Rozenblit and Keil (2002) showed that people are much 
more overconfident in the knowledge domains about technical apparatuses and natural 
phenomena than in almanac questions such as those often used in 2AFC GKQs task. 
       As an example, consider the research done by Murphy and Winkler in 1971 (cited in 
Allwood & Granhag, 1999) on meteorologists. They have been found to be very well calibrated 
in their predictions. An explanation of this may be that they have lots of experience in making 
forecasts, they have amassed on enormous amount of data to make retrospective comparisons 
and their feedback is clear and quite immediate (is it rainy and windy here today?). Compare this 
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with a lawyer who is working with a case the outcome of which is determined by a court six 
months in the future (temporal relation). While working s/he can affect the outcome in various 
ways, self-involvement is (probably) high, the type of feedback is clear but delayed and the degree 
of experience could vary greatly from lawyer to lawyer. A further comparison with one of the 
usual tasks given in calibration research could further highlight this matter. Consider the factors 
involved in a 2AFC GKQ task. This is a current judgement of your own semantic knowledge 
with only two options which you are instructed to perform. Self involvement is (possibly) quite 
low and often no feedback is given so you can’t learn to improve your performance.  
       Taking heed of Poppers remark one would hope for the development of many more models 
of human judgement under uncertainty which are adapted to different real-life circumstances, 
since it’s highly improbable that someone succeeds in building a general model that can account 
for all the various ways and contexts in which one may make a confidence judgement.  
       Another philosophical remark could be made at this point. There are those who think that 
there will always be an explanatory gap in between what we know of where different processes in 
the brain take place and what it’s like to experience those very same processes (Scheele, 2002). 
Or, if we turn the tables, even though we might have a reasonably good understanding of what 
processes affect human decision making we might never fully understand how the brain realizes 
those processes. This is yet another challenge facing the development of a cognitive neuroscience 
of metacognition. 
 
Previous research on frequency judgements 
In comparison with the abundant research on singular confidence judgements, the reported 
studies on global assessments or frequency judgements is rather scarce. Nevertheless, I’ll try to 
set the stage as to why frequency judgements have drawn some interest. Generally people reason 
differently about an individual case than about a set of cases, especially when the set is presented 
in the form of statistics.  
       If one reads in the newspaper about the mistreatment someone has received, rather than 
only being presented with statistical information, then this arouses more empathy or anger 
because it’s a concrete person whom it is easy to identify with. Even doctors have been shown to 
give more expensive treatment when faced with a single patient. When the same doctor is 
confronted by a set of patients he is much more likely to recommend treatments that are in line 
with a stricter rational cost-benefit analysis (Griffin & Buehler, 1999).  
       At the same time this example shows the difference between rule-based versus exemplar-
based reasoning (Juslin & Olsson, 2004). When people consider a single case they apparently 
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focus on information that is relevant to that case and neglect the rules of probability that links 
that case to broader categories or frequencies, also called base-rate neglect. Those who have 
access to aggregate information stored statistically usually engage in reasoning which invokes 
rules that are relevant to statistically-based properties of set inclusion. Gigerenzer has made the 
bold claim that “the effect of frequency representations and judgements on ‘cognitive illusions’ is 
the strongest and most consistent ‘debiasing method’ known today” (cited in Griffin & Buehler, 
1999, pp. 49-50).  
       Cosmides and Tooby (1996) has in a similar vein argued that the notoriously difficult 
problem used within the “heuristics and biases” program for eliciting base rate neglect can be 
solved by most people rather easily when the percentages in the original “medical diagnosis 
problem” are given in frequencies instead. For yet another poignant point of view in this context, 
see the last sentence of the next section.  
 
The confidence-frequency effect 
The most intriguing finding concerning research on frequency judgements has been referred to as 
the confidence-frequency effect. This effect describes the relationship between confidence 
judgements (which typically result in overconfidence) and frequency judgements. When 
confidence judgements are overconfident then frequency judgements tend to show good realism, 
that is, they are fairly accurate. When confidence judgements exhibit good realism, then 
frequency judgements tend to result in more or less underestimation or underconfidence.  
This confidence-frequency effect has been reported 1991 by Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and 
Kleinbölting (cited in McClelland & Bolger, 1994) and by Sniezek and Buckley (1991) among 
others. 
       Previous studies concerning the confidence-frequency effect are not conclusive. Whereas 
some researchers have been able to replicate this effect in their studies (e.g. Treadwell & Nelson, 
1996) others have found that both measures show substantial overconfidence (e.g. Brenner et al., 
1996). Griffin and Buehler (1999) after three studies succinctly concluded that, “The studies 
presented here imply that under most real-life circumstances, intuitive judgements are equally 
biased regardless of the level of aggregation or whether frequency and probability is used” (p. 75).  
 
       Explanations of the confidence-frequency effect 
According to Gigerenzer et al., 1991, (see McClelland & Bolger, 1994) confidence and frequency 
judgements belong to different reference classes. Consider the 2AFC GKQ example given above 
on page 12, the reference class is European countries but the frequency judgement itself belongs 
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to the participant’s own reference class of previously answered questions in a similar situation. In 
sets of informally selected items the frequency judgements should show perfect realism because 
people have the experience that general knowledge tests are more difficult than they seem and 
therefore give less optimistic frequency judgements. Another inference from this theory is that 
when representative randomly sampled item sets are used, then frequency judgements should 
exhibit underestimation because the item-specific confidence judgements on the same questions 
that made up this set would exhibit, more or less, perfect realism. 
       Next, let’s briefly look at how Sniezek and Buckley’s (1991) dual-process hypothesis explains this 
effect. From their studies they concluded that confidence judgements for single items are affected 
by retrieval and evaluation of information about the item content. Miscalibration can hence be 
attributed to faulty information processing. When frequency judgements are considered they 
suggest that participants don’t evaluate the information in the same way because of (1) the large 
number of items and (2) the heterogeneous content of those items.  
       When making a global or frequency judgement participants presumably take themselves into 
consideration. They might estimate their expertise relative to the demands of the task or their 
previous performances on similar tasks, or of the time and effort allocation. By making this 
distinction between knowledge of the subject matter and knowledge about one’s previous test 
performances, it is possible to understand the item-specific confidence judgement and the 
frequency judgement as different types of judgement, perhaps affected by different processes or 
at least different content and therefore they need not exhibit identical levels of confidence.  
       When Treadwell and Nelson (1996) performed two studies to examine the confidence-
frequency effect they found that the dual-process account best described their data. They also 
added the suggestion that frequency judgements may exhibit better realism than confidence 
judgements. 
       A similar explanation as the dual-process hypothesis has been given by Griffin and Tversky 
in 1992 (reported in Griffin & Buehler, 1999), but they also suggested that it could also be due to 
the participants only considering those items of which they are certain when assessing their 
performance over a whole set of questions and fail to adjust that estimate upwards because they 
could in fact be correct on some of the items for which they have guessed. This suggestion was 
due to that Griffin and Tversky observed that frequency judgements in 2AFC problems 
sometimes are below 50 %. This goes against the notion that simply by chance one would expect 
an accuracy of 50 % (on average, over the long run).  
       Liberman (2004) took this suggestion seriously and made three experiments to explore if this 
failure to correct for guessing can account for the discrepancy between local and global 
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assessments of confidence, or in our terminology, confidence and frequency judgements. His 
results suggest that people don’t make a correction for guessing unless specifically asked and this 
normative failure can explain the discrepancy between confidence and frequency judgements in 
calibration studies. He also took issue with the assumption that frequency judgements would be 
more realistic in general as compared with confidence judgements. Liberman states clearly that 
“…the lack of overconfidence in global estimates is not evidence of greater realism or 
normativeness but rather a product of, and in fact dependent on, a familiar normative failure – 
the failure to make allowance for random guessing” (Liberman, 2004, p. 731). 
 
Absolute versus relative frequency judgements 
Treadwell and Nelson (1996) reported that frequency judgements not always exhibit good realism 
or underestimation. Likewise, Brenner et al. (1996) and Liberman (2004) found that relative 
frequency judgements (i.e., estimate given in per cent) can show overestimation. Hoffrage et al. 
(2002) have proposed that there might be a difference in how people make an absolute versus a 
relative frequency judgement. They made the claim that it is more cumbersome to make an 
estimate in relative frequencies as compared with natural frequencies or absolute frequencies (i.e., 
estimate given in natural numbers). To my knowledge, no one has made a study to explore if 
there in fact is a difference in realism between absolute and relative frequency judgements when 
2AFC GKQs are used. 
 
 
Summary and a remark 
The models presented above have more or less successfully attempted to explain the general 
overconfidence phenomenon typically reported for confidence judgements and the degree of 
realism found for frequency judgements in calibration research. Another source of contention 
has been how to explain the hard-easy effect. Taken together, the enduring question has been 
whether these phenomena reflect genuine psychological phenomena or if they depend on 
methodological consequences.  
       A more recent finding is what is referred to as the confidence-frequency effect, which in 
short denotes that the level of confidence judgements typically is higher than the corresponding 
frequency judgement. This effect is something of a paradox since people can maintain a high 
confidence across single item knowledge claims but still estimate that their general performance 
level over the same set of items is much lower. Based on this curious finding it has been 
proposed that when people make these metacognitive judgements they do so depending on at 
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least partly different processes or content (e.g. Allwood & Granhag, 1999; Sniezek & Buckley, 
1991).  
       The distinction between confidence and frequency judgements is related to a schism between 
subjectivists or Bayesians and frequentists as reported by Johansson (2004). Bayesians maintain 
that probability should be seen as a subjective measure of belief and allow the assignment of 
probabilities to unique events and require these assignments to obey the probability axiom, that 
is, when considering the probabilities for different alternatives these probabilities should be 
additive and sum up to 1 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996). Frequentists, who tend to be the same 
researchers as those subscribing to ecological models, on the other hand, interpret probability as 
long-run relative frequency and refuse to assign probability to unique events. Apart from this 
disagreement they depart in their views on whether overconfidence reflects a genuine 
psychological bias due to imperfect information processes or reflects specific tasks used by the 
researcher.  
       After this general synopsis of some of the main questions within the calibration research 
tradition, the following section is intended to present different aspects of realism and how it is 
measured by the calibration methodology. The following presentation pinpoints a few of the 
most relevant issues from an excellent description made by Johansson (2004). 
 
Calibration research and methodology  
       Participants who partake in a calibration research study are usually asked to choose which 
answer alternative in a 2AFC GKQ set they believe to be correct and then to confidence judge 
the correctness of their choice. This is usually done on a half-range (50-100 %) scale. The 
participants receive instructions that say that 100 % stands for being absolutely certain of having 
chosen the correct answer, while 50 % means that they have made a guess. In the case of 
frequency judgements, after having answered a block of GKQs and confidence judged all items 
one by one, the participants are asked to estimate how many of the questions in the very same 
block of questions they have answered correctly. Thus, the “…realism in confidence judgements 
may generally be defined as the extent to which confidence judgments conform to the proportion 
of correct assertions or accuracy” (Johansson, 2004, p. 5). A concrete example of this is that if a 
person states that s/he is 70 % certain in the chosen answer and have assigned it the 
corresponding probability 0.7 then, in the long run to be judged as realistic, it means that on all of 
the questions assigned the same probability value, 70 % of these questions should be correct.  
       This general definition of realism in confidence judgements also applies to frequency 
judgements. “The degree of realism in people’s frequency judgements is defined as the extent to 
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which their assessments of overall accuracy conform to their actual accuracy.” (Johansson, 2004, 
p. 5). There are other more specific measures such as calibration, over/underconfidence and 
resolution that are used by researchers to describe the relation between people’s confidence 
judgements and accuracy. These measures of realism are called calibration measures and are 
typically used to analyze the realism in participants’ confidence judgements. They are presented 
more fully in the next section. 
 
Calibration measures  
The following text in this section is cited from a study made by Allwood, Granhag and Johansson 
(2003) since the present author does not think that he can improve on that description. 
 
Calibration reflects the overall relation between the level of confidence judgements and the 
accuracy. A calibration score of 0 indicates perfect calibration and higher values reflect poorer 
realism. The formula for computing calibration is: 
                                                                         T 
(1)                                        Calibration = 1/n ∑ nt (r tm – c t)²                                                 
                                                                       t = 1 
 
In (1), n is the total number of questions answered, T is the number of confidence classes used,  
c t  is the proportion correct for all items in the confidence class, rt, nt is the number of times the 
confidence class rt was used and rtm is the mean of the confidence ratings in confidence class rt. 
Thus, calibration is computed by first dividing participants’ confidence ratings into a number  
of confidence classes. Next, for each confidence class, the difference is taken between the mean 
confidence for the items and the proportion of correct items. Finally, the squared differences 
multiplied by the number of responses in the confidence class are summed over confidence 
classes and divided by the total number of items. 
       The over/underconfidence measure (henceforth called overconfidence) indicates that a person is 
overconfident (positive value) or underconfident (negative value). Overconfidence is computed  
in the same way as calibration, except that the differences are not squared. Higher absolute 
over/underconfidence values indicates higher over- or underconfidence, or less realistic 
confidence judgements. A value of zero indicates perfect realism. 
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Resolution  
Loosely speaking, resolution reflects the ability of the participants to distinguish, by their 
confidence ratings, between two sets of answers: one set that is correct and one set that is 
incorrect. The formula for computing resolution is: 
                                                                        T 
(2)                                        Resolution = 1/n ∑ nt (ct – c)²                                                 
                                                                      t = 1 
 
Here, in (2), c is the proportion of all items for which the correct alternative was selected.  
A higher value reflects better resolution than a lower. (p. 550) 
 
For more extensive descriptions of these measures and their derivation from the Brier score see 
the expositions by Keren (1991) and Lichtenstein et al. (1982). To achieve good resolution a 
person has to assign, for example, lower confidence to all questions answered incorrectly 
compared with the questions answered correctly. A concrete example might explain this further. 
Consider two persons A and B both achieving c = 75 %. Person A consistently states 75 % 
confidence on all answers whereas person B is 50 % and 100 % correct when being 50 % and 
100 % confident. Consequently person B shows much better discrimination ability than person 
A. Even though only person B shows perfect resolution, both person A and B are equally realistic 
in terms of calibration and overconfidence (e.g., Goldman, 1986; Johansson, 2004). In addition to 
these measures of realism this study also use mean accuracy, mean confidence, mean frequency 
and frealism in analyzing the results of the experiment. Frealism measures the degree of realism 
in the frequency judgements. In this paper the over/underconfidence measure will be denoted as 
ouconfidence. 
 
Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis concerns the confidence-frequency effect. Based on the results from previous 
research the first hypothesis was that there would be overconfidence in the confidence 
judgements when the frequency judgements result in good realism and when the confidence 
judgements show good realism the frequency judgements should show underestimation.  
       The second hypothesis delves deeper into the issue of frequency judgements. Since previous 
researchers have suggested, but not investigated, that relative frequency judgements as compared 
with absolute frequency judgements may exhibit overestimation, that result was predicted.  
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       The third hypothesis hinges on Liberman’s study (2004) in which he proposed that the level 
of relative frequency judgements will approach the level of realism in the confidence judgements 
when participants receive an instruction to incorporate a correction for guessing, that is, to 
include in the correct answers half of those items on which they evaluated they have guessed the 
answer. Since the lack of correspondence between the confidence and the frequency judgements 
could have other explanations as well, the third hypothesis predicted only a partial replication of 
Liberman’s results in the relative condition. This means that in the absolute format there was still 
expected a larger discrepancy between the confidence and the frequency judgements even though 
the participants received an instruction to incorporate a correction for guessing. 
       Finally, the fourth hypothesis predicted realistic frequency judgements after the difficult set 
of questions and underconfidence in frequency judgements after the easy set of questions in 
those conditions where the participants did not receive an instruction to make a correction for 
guessing. Hopefully there will be the same difference between the absolute and relative format as 
predicted by the second hypothesis. This hypothesis was based on the dual-process hypothesis 
explained earlier (p. 23) and it also follows from the hard-easy effect.  
       For the harder set of question one would presumably take into account that it felt harder, 
was answered a bit slower and so forth, and thus adjust one’s estimate to a more realistic level 
and the confidence judgements should show overconfidence. For the easy set of questions one 
would also adjust downwards from the level of confidence judgements according to the 
confidence-frequency effect, which now should show better realism, but this would lead to an 
underestimation when making the frequency judgement.  
       Since none of the reviewed models or theories has made any comparison between the factor 
instruction for guessing and difficulty level of the questions I couldn’t do anything but speculate 
that perhaps there would be a shift in the levels of the frequency judgements so that after 
receiving the instruction to make a correction for guessing then the level of the frequency 
judgements for the set of easy questions (where the level of the frequency judgements without 
correction for guessing is likely to show underconfidence) would be a bit more realistic whereas 
for the set of hard set of questions they should show overestimation. 
 
 
Method 
       Participants 
In all, 112 undergraduate students of psychology from Lund University, Sweden, participated in 
the study (71 women and 41 men). The participants’ mean age was 27 years (range of 18 to 50 
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years). There were 28 participants who acted in each condition and they were randomized across 
4 conditions. They were not given any reward or other gratifications for participating. 
 
       Design 
This study was planned to investigate whether there is a difference in realism in frequency 
judgement when participants are asked to make (1) a frequency judgement with or without 
correction for guessing, (2) an absolute versus relative frequency judgement and (3) for easy and 
hard questions. The participants were randomized into four between-subject conditions. The 
conditions differed as to the type of frequency judgement the subjects were asked to perform.  
       In condition 1 the participants were asked to perform an absolute frequency judgement 
without correction for guessing. In condition 2 the participants were given the same instruction 
as in Liberman’s (2004) experiment 3, the neutral condition (Instruction, see Appendix B), to 
make a correction for guessing before they were asked to perform an absolute frequency 
judgement. In condition 3 the participants were asked to perform a relative frequency judgement 
without correction for guessing. Finally, in condition 4 the participants were given the same 
instruction as in Liberman’s study 3, the neutral condition, to make a correction for guessing 
before they were asked to perform a relative frequency judgement. In all conditions there were 80 
general knowledge questions (GKQs) which were divided into an easier and a harder set of 40 
questions each. The order of easy-hard and hard-easy questions was balanced within each 
condition. 
 
       Materials 
Questionnaire. A total of 80 two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) general knowledge questions 
(GKQ’s) were given to the participants. All of these questions have previously been used by 
Allwood, Granhag and Johansson (2003), but questions which in that study had proven to be 
very easy (90 % or more correct) or very difficult (25 % or less correct answers in previous 
research) were eliminated. The original list of 90 GKQs was thus reduced to 80. The questions 
cover topics including nature, society, history, geography and lexical knowledge. 
 
       Procedure 
The participants were recruited on a voluntary basis from courses given at the Lund university’s 
department for psychology and were tested in smaller groups of 2-12 individuals at each time. 
Before the actual experiment was commenced, a small pilot study was conducted with four 
participants, to check how they understand the instructions and to get an approximate estimate 
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about the test completion time. On the basis of this pilot test there was no reason to change any 
of the instructions since they appeared to be understood as intended. The time used by these four 
participants to complete the test was in between 20 to 30 minutes.  
       In each condition the participants were asked to make a confidence judgement immediately 
after each question on a half-range-scale from 50 % (guessing) to 100 % (absolutely certain that 
the chosen answer is correct). It was pointed out that one of the two alternatives always was 
correct. 
       After each set of 40 questions the participants were asked to make a frequency judgement 
according to the condition-specific instructions concerning their total performance on those 40 
questions.  Then in all conditions the exact same procedure was repeated with the next set of 40 
questions according to the same specific instructions as given for the first set of questions. All 
participants spent 15 to 30 minutes to complete the test. 
 
 
Results 
First I report the basic descriptive statistics for the five dependent measures, accuracy, 
confidence, calibration, ouconfidence and resolution. Next I report t-tests testing if there were 
any concrete order effect of the order of the easy and the hard questions on any of these 
measures and of the extent to which the measures calibration, ouconfidence and resolution 
differed from zero. Thereafter I present the results of the analysis of the effects of the between-
subject factors Instruction: No correction for guessing/Correction for guessing and Format: 
Absolute/Relative and the within-subject factor Difficulty Level: Easy/Hard for which a 3 way 
ANOVA was computed. Next, under the heading frequency judgements, I present the results that are 
directly concerned with the core of my hypotheses. 
 
Accuracy, confidence and the calibration measures 
Table 1 (below) shows the means and standard deviations for the sets of easy and hard questions 
for each condition and each of the five dependent measures, accuracy, confidence, calibration, 
over/underconfidence (ouconfidence) and resolution. 
       As a first background analysis, the effect of the concrete order in which the participants 
encountered the two sets of 40 2AFC GKQ’s was analyzed by means of a paired-sample t-test for 
each of the five dependent measures. Thus, for each dependent measure the results for the order 
easy-hard questions were compared with the results for the order hard-easy questions. The results 
showed that there were no significant differences on any of the dependent measures.  
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) of the Dependent Measures Accuracy, Confidence, 
Calibration, Ouconfidence and Resolution for the Easy Set and the Hard Set of Questions for 
Each Condition (n = 28 for Each Column) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                     Condition 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                        No correction for guessing                        Correction for guessing 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure                           Absolute                Relative                    Absolute                Relative 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Accuracy Easy                .751 (.092)            .755 (.090)                 .775 (.071)             .773 (.105) 
Accuracy Hard               .474 (.089)            .501 (.115)                 .530 (.100)             .531 (.137) 
 
Confidence Easy            .687 (.075)            .714 (.065)                  .716 (.068)             .720 (.083) 
Confidence Hard           .648 (.069)            .664 (.065)                  .673 (.077)             .676 (.075) 
 
Calibration Easy             .027 (.018)            .036 (.020)                  .028 (.017)             .032 (.016) 
Calibration Hard            .075 (.053)             .078 (.045)                 .074 (.060)             .068 (.049) 
 
Ouconfidence Easy       -.064 (.074)           -.040 (.087)                -.059 (.079)           -.053 (.085) 
Ouconfidence Hard       .174 (.113)             .164 (.115)                  .142 (.099)            .145 (.109) 
 
Resolution Easy             .030 (.016)             .032 (.022)                  .029 (.014)            .030 (.026) 
Resolution Hard            .033 (.016)             .030 (.021)                  .035 (.018)            .029 (.015) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: All means are given in proportions. Ouconfidence = a positive number indicates 
overconfidence and a negative number indicates underconfidence. 
 
 
       Next, I carried out one-sample t-tests to analyze for each condition and question difficulty 
level if the three calibration measures, calibration, ouconfidence and resolution differed 
significantly from 0 (test-value = 0, i.e., perfect realism for calibration and ouconfidence). The 
results for the condition No Correction for guessing/Absolute were for Calibration Easy, t (27) = 
7.86, p < .001, Calibration Hard, t (27) = 7.42, p < .001, Ouconfidence Easy, t (27) = -4.52,  
p < .001, Ouconfidence Hard, t (27) = 8.15, p < .001, Resolution Easy, t (27) = 10.09, p < .001 
and Resolution Hard, t (27) = 11.03, p < .001.   
       The results for condition No Correction for guessing/Relative were for Calibration Easy,  
t (27) = 9.43, p < .001, Calibration Hard, t (27) = 9.20, p < .001, Ouconfidence Easy, t (27) = 
 -2.45, p < .05, Ouconfidence Hard, t (27) = 7.56, p < .001, Resolution Easy, t (27) = 7.76,  
p < .001 and Resolution Hard, t (27) = 7.53, p < .001.  
       The results for condition Correction for guessing/Absolute were for Calibration Easy, t (27) 
= 8.86, p < .001, Calibration Hard, t (27) = 6.51, p < .001, Ouconfidence Easy, t (27) = -3.92,  
p < .001, Ouconfidence Hard, t (27) = 7.57, p < .001, Resolution Easy, t (27) = 10.77, p < .001 
and Resolution Hard, t (27) = 10.49, p < .001.  
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       Finally, the results for condition Correction for guessing/Relative were for Calibration Easy, 
t (27) = 10.81, p < .001, Calibration Hard, t (27) = 7.40, p < .001, Ouconfidence Easy, t (27) =  
-3.32, p = .003, Ouconfidence Hard, t (27) = 7.05, p < .001, Resolution Easy, t (27) = 6.21,  
p < .001 and Resolution Hard, t (27) = 10.12, p < .001.  
       The results thus showed a significant difference on all tests, that is, all these calibration 
measures differed significantly from 0. Accordingly, the calibration and ouconfidence measures 
did not show perfect realism. 
 
Evaluation of the effects of the factors instruction, format and difficulty level 
Next, in order to analyze the effect of the factors Instruction, Format and Difficulty Level I 
carried out a 2 (Instruction: No Correction for guessing/Correction for guessing) x 2 (Format: 
Absolute/Relative) x 2 (Difficulty Level: Easy/Hard) mixed ANOVA on each of the five 
dependent measures. Note that these results are not of immediate relevance to our hypotheses 
because these are mainly concerned with the outcomes of the various frequency judgements. 
       The results showed a significant main effect of the between-subject factor Instruction (No 
Correction for guessing/Correction for guessing) for accuracy, F (1, 108) = 4.212, p < .05, ŋ² = .04 
but no significant effect on the other dependent measures. For the between-subject factor 
Format (Absolute/Relative) no significant main effects were found. There were no significant 
interaction effects of these two factors. 
       The results showed a significant main effect of the within-subject factor (Easy/Hard) for 
accuracy, F (1, 108) = 542.00, p < .001, ŋ² = .83, confidence, F (1, 108) = 147.41, p < .001, ŋ² = .58, 
calibration, F (1, 108) = 65.34, p < .001, ŋ² = .38 and ouconfidence, F (1, 108) = 411.73, p < .001, ŋ² 
= .79. However, there was no significant effect for resolution, which indicates that the participants’ 
ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect responses was not affected by the difficulty 
of the questions.  
       Since no interaction effects were observed involving the within-subject factor Difficulty 
Level these results suggest that the outcomes do not depend on which condition the participants 
were in, but instead the results followed from the difficulty of the questions. After these general 
results we next deal with the analysis of the material that concerns the bulk of the hypotheses 
outlined above (pp. 27-28).  
 
Frequency judgements 
The frequency judgements, given at the end of each set of questions in all conditions, were 
transformed into relative frequencies (proportions) to enable an easy comparison with the 
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accuracy results (see Table 2 on page 35). For the set of easy questions the transformed mean 
frequency judgement were .495 for the No Correction for guessing/Absolute condition (actual 
accuracy, .751), .559 for the No Correction for guessing/Relative condition (actual accuracy, 
.755), .582 for the Correction for guessing/Absolute condition (actual accuracy, .775), and .721 
for the Correction for guessing/Relative condition (actual accuracy, .773). For ease of 
comparison Figure 1 is presented below, which show the median and the distribution in quartiles 
for the measures confidence, accuracy and frequency judgements for the set of easy questions. 
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Figure 1. The median and the distribution in quartiles for the measures accuracy, confidence and 
frequency for the set of easy questions. The same convention as in Table 1 and Table 2 has been 
used therefore the scale on the y-axis is in proportions. Accuracy Easy Qs = accuracy for the set 
of easy questions. Confidence Easy Qs = confidence for the set of easy questions. Frequency 
Easy Qs = frequency judgements for the set of easy questions. The circles with the numbers next 
to them represent outliers. (n = 28 in each condition). 
 
       For the set of hard questions the mean frequency judgements were .427 for the No 
Correction for guessing/Absolute condition (actual accuracy, .474), .495 for the No Correction 
for guessing/Relative condition (actual accuracy, .501), .514 for the Correction for 
guessing/Absolute condition (actual accuracy, .530), and .652 for the Correction for 
guessing/Relative condition (actual accuracy, .531). For ease of comparison Figure 2 is presented 
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below, which show the median and the distribution in quartiles for the measures confidence, 
accuracy and frequency judgements for the set of hard questions. 
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Figure 2. The median and the distribution in quartiles for the measures accuracy, confidence and 
frequency for the set of hard questions. The same convention as in Table 1 and Table 2 has been 
used therefore the scale on the y-axis is in proportions. Accuracy Hard Qs = accuracy for the set 
of hard questions. Confidence Hard Qs = confidence for the set of hard questions. Frequency 
Hard Qs = frequency judgements for the set of hard questions. The circles with the numbers 
next to them represent outliers. (n = 28 in each condition). 
 
       Next I computed one-sample t-tests to analyze for each condition and question difficulty 
level if the frequency judgements made by the participants differed significantly from 50 (test-
value 50 = chance level for frequency judgements). The results were significant in all conditions 
for Frequency Easy, t (27) = all values < -1237.36, p < .001 and for Frequency Hard, t (27) = all 
values < -1234.02, p < .001.  
       The mean difference between the frequency judgements and the actual accuracy is shown in 
the lower part of Table 2 (below) for the different conditions and is called FRealism (standing for 
realism of the frequency judgements). The measure of realism which is presented in the table is 
based on the formula FRealism = Frequency Judgement – Accuracy, which was used to compute 
the results for both of the two sets of questions.  
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) of Frequency Judgements and Realism in 
Frequency Judgements, i.e. Frequency - Accuracy for Each Condition (n = 28/Condition/Column) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                Condition 
                                 ___________________________________________________________ 
                                     No correction for guessing                      Correction for guessing 
                                 __________________________      ______________________________ 
Measure                         Absolute              Relative                    Absolute                Relative 
______________    _____________   ____________      _____________     _______________ 
Frequency Easy           .495 (.212)            .559 (.211)                .582 (.197)              .721 (.110) 
Frequency Hard          .427 (.177)            .495 (.212)                .514 (.182)              .652 (.124) 
 
FRealism Easy           -.256 (.217)**        -.195 (.184)**           -.193 (.207)**          -.053 (.085)* 
FRealism Hard          -.047 (.215)            -.006 (.199)              -.016 (.211)               .121 (.123)** 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: For the FRealism measures * = p < .05 and ** = p < .001 refers to the comparison if 
FRealism in each condition differed from zero. 
 
 
       The results for the set of easy questions showed that 93 of the participants had a negative 
difference which means that their actual accuracy on answering the questions were higher than 
their estimated accuracy as reported by their frequency judgement. 17 of the participants had a 
positive difference which means that their frequency judgements overestimated their number of 
correct answers. Two of the participants showed perfect realism of their frequency judgements. 
       I carried out one-sample t-tests to analyze for each condition if the measure FRealism on the 
set of easy questions differed significantly from 0 (test-value = 0, i.e. perfect realism). The result 
for condition No Correction for guessing/Absolute was FRealism Easy, t (27) = -6.24, p < .001, 
for condition No Correction for guessing/Relative FRealism Easy, t (27) = -5.63, p < .001, for 
condition Correction for guessing/Absolute FRealism Easy, t (27) = -4.95, p < .001 and for 
condition Correction for guessing/Relative FRealism Easy, t (27) = -3.28, p = .003. The result of 
the same one-sample t-tests for the set of hard questions was only significant for condition 
Correction for guessing/Relative for FRealism Hard, t (27) = 5.17, p < .001. Within this 
condition all participants had a positive difference on the FRealism measure which means that 
they believed they chose the correct answer more often than they factually did. 
 
Evaluation of the effects of the factors instruction, format and difficulty level on frequency judgements 
After this, in order to analyze the effects of factors Instruction, Format and Difficulty Level, I 
computed a 2 (Instruction: No Correction for guessing/Correction for guessing) x 2 (Format: 
Absolute/Relative) x 2 (Difficulty Level: Easy/Hard) mixed ANOVA on the results for the 
frequency judgements and for the measures of FRealism. The results showed a significant main 
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effect of the between-subject factor Instruction (No Correction for guessing/Correction for 
guessing) for the frequency judgements, F (1, 108) = 14.03, p < .001, ŋ² = .12 and for FRealism, F  
(1, 108) = 7.60, p < .05, ŋ² = .07. The results also showed significant main effects of the between-
subject factor Format (Absolute/Relative) for the frequency judgements, F (1, 108) = 9.64, p < .05,  
ŋ² = .08 and for FRealism, F (1, 108) = 8.27, p < .05, ŋ² = .07. Moreover, the results showed 
significant main effects of the within-subject factor Difficulty level (Easy/Hard) for the frequency 
judgements, F (1, 108) = 43.30, p < .001, ŋ² = .29 and for FRealism, F (1, 108) = 229.92, p < .001,  
ŋ² = .68. There were no significant interaction effects for these tests. This means there were 
simple main effects of all three factors Instruction, Format and Difficulty Level. 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated whether there is a difference in realism in frequency judgements 
when participants are asked to make (1) a frequency judgement with or without a correction for 
guessing, (2) an absolute versus relative frequency judgement and (3) for easy and hard sets of 
questions. These factors were named: Instruction (No correction for guessing/Correction for 
guessing), Format (Absolute/Relative) and Difficulty level (Easy/Hard). All three factors were 
found to have a significant main effect on the level of the frequency judgements and their realism 
(frequency judgement – accuracy). In addition, there were no interaction effects. The results 
suggest that the level and the realism of frequency judgements are both affected by different 
factors. Below, I summarize and discuss these factors pertaining to the hypotheses. Before that I 
will make a comment in regard to the hard-easy effect and the overconfidence phenomenon. 
 
The hard-easy effect and overconfidence 
Since the issue as to why the hard-easy effect typically is found in calibration research was of no 
immediate interest in this study it may just be noted that this effect was present. From Figures 1 
and 2 presented on pages 33-34 one can see that there was a marked overconfidence in all 
conditions for the hard set of questions and slight underconfidence in all conditions for the easy 
question sets.  
       Actually, this accord quite well with Keren’s (1991) suggestion that participants use an 
anchor on a probability estimate reflecting intermediate difficulty which, for 2AFC GKQs is,  
75 %. This anchor worked quite well for most of the participants in all conditions for the set of 
easy questions. However, as Keren suggested the participants did not adjust this anchor 
sufficiently when they encountered the set of hard questions. They did adjust a bit, which can be 
seen in Table 1 on page 31, but far from sufficiently. 
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       Since neither interviews nor written protocols were used I can only speculate as to why the 
participants in all conditions exhibited such marked overconfidence on the hard question set. 
Perhaps some participants used a faulty cue as proposed by the process model and the ecological 
models. Perhaps some participants didn’t consider the strength and weight of the evidence for 
the two alternatives or maybe they didn’t consider evidence for their residual hypothesis as 
Tversky and Koehler (1994) has suggested. This would mean that some participants used the 
recognition heuristic and simply ignored the other alternative as Todd and Gigerenzer (2003) 
have proposed. Whatever is the case, let’s now turn our attention to the issues pertaining to the 
factors investigated as mentioned above. 
 
The confidence-frequency effect 
The pattern of results more or less with three exceptions supported the first hypothesis that 
when the confidence judgements exhibit overconfidence then the frequency judgements result in 
good realism and when the confidence judgements show good realism then the frequency 
judgements show underestimation. On a general level, a comparison of the means for accuracy, 
confidence and frequency judgements regardless of the questions difficulty level shows that the 
confidence judgements were slightly overconfident and that the frequency judgements were 
underconfident.  
       If one separates the results for these measures for the sets of easy and hard questions then 
the confidence judgements for the set of easy questions show slight underconfidence whereas the 
frequency judgements show markedly more underconfidence. For the set of hard questions the 
confidence judgements showed overconfidence whereas the frequency judgements exhibited 
almost perfect realism. 
       More specifically, for the set of easy questions the level of confidence judgements was fairly 
realistic but showed slight and significant underconfidence in all conditions. The frequency 
judgements showed, as predicted, significant underestimation, but in the Correction for 
guessing/relative condition the frequency judgements were on the same level as the 
corresponding mean confidence judgements.  
       For the set of hard questions the level of confidence judgements showed significant 
overconfidence in all conditions while the level of frequency judgement was realistic in all 
conditions except in the Correction for guessing/relative condition where it was almost on par 
with the overconfidence exhibited by the confidence judgements. The levels of confidence and 
frequency judgements thus almost followed the predicted pattern. 
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       These results are only partly compatible with Gigerenzer et al.’s 1991 (described in 
McClelland & Bolger, 1994) explanation of the confidence-frequency effect. Considering that I 
used sets of informally selected items then frequency judgements should show perfect realism but 
this was only true in three conditions for the set of hard questions. Furthermore, the frequency 
judgements showed underestimation in all conditions for the set of easy questions. This is what 
Gigerenzer et al. predicted would be the finding when representative, randomly sampled item sets 
are used. In this study underestimation occurred in spite of the fact that informally selected items 
were used.  
       The dual-process hypothesis seems to best account for the data with one notable exception.  
In all conditions, except the Correction for guessing/relative condition, on both levels of 
difficulty of the questions the mean level of the confidence judgements was always markedly 
higher than the comparable frequency judgements. Sniezek and Buckley (1991) made the 
prediction that frequency judgements would be lower than the confidence judgements and they 
also presented empirical support that the frequency judgements were more realistic, at least 
showed less overconfidence than the mean level of the confidence judgements. However, the 
dual-process hypothesis is falsified in the Correction for guessing/relative condition since both 
types of judgement show almost exactly the same level of underestimation for the set of easy 
questions and almost exactly the same level of overestimation for the set of hard questions.  
       Liberman (2004) suggested that if participants incorporate a correction for guessing in their 
frequency judgements they would approach the same level of realism as in the confidence 
judgements. The results in this study are partly compatible with Liberman’s proposal. In the No 
correction for guessing/relative condition for both difficulty levels of the questions, the level of 
the frequency judgements was much lower than the mean level of the confidence judgements. In 
the Correction for guessing/relative condition for both difficulty levels of the questions the 
frequency judgements was almost on the same level as the mean level of the confidence 
judgements for both difficulty levels of the questions. The same type of comparison in the 
absolute format did not reveal the same type of pattern. According to the third hypothesis that 
was not expected either. 
 
Absolute versus relative frequency judgements 
The prediction of the second hypothesis, that relative frequency judgements as compared to 
absolute frequency judgements would exhibit overestimation, was not supported by the results 
except in the Correction for guessing/relative condition as compared with the Correction for 
guessing/absolute condition and there only for the hard set of questions. The participants in the 
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No correction for guessing in both absolute and relative conditions almost approached perfect 
realism in their frequency judgements for the set of hard questions which contradicts the 
hypothesis. However, the effect sizes for the factor format were quite small. These results suggest 
that one can expect good realism when people make frequency estimates on a set of hard 
questions and in terms of natural numbers. The suggestion made by Cosmides and Tooby (1996) 
that people make better estimates when asked to do so in natural numbers is therefore only given 
partial support since the participants in the present study gravely underestimated their 
performance on the set of easy questions even though they gave their estimates in natural 
numbers. 
       Although the results did not show overestimation for all relative frequency judgements there 
is, however, a pattern which is discernable from the presented results. For the format 
absolute/relative the main effect showed the following tendency. In all comparisons between the 
levels of absolute versus relative frequency judgements, within the same level of the instruction 
factor, the level of relative frequency judgements was always higher than the corresponding 
absolute frequency judgements. I coin the term absolute-relative effect to describe this pattern.  
       The results support neither the suggestion made by Brenner et al. (1996), nor the speculation 
by Hoffrage et al. (2002) that making an estimate in natural numbers would be easier and 
therefore should exhibit better realism. On the other hand, these researchers have not, to my 
knowledge, considered what effects the factors difficulty level and instruction could have on the 
level of absolute and relative frequency judgements. Liberman (2004) did consider the factor 
instruction (discussed next) but he did not consider the difficulty level of the questions or 
whether there would be a difference between the levels of realism in frequency judgements if 
they are given in terms of absolute or relative numbers. 
 
The guessing instruction factor 
The third hypothesis predicted a partial replication of Liberman’s (2004) results in the relative 
format. To reiterate, when participants receive an instruction to incorporate a correction for 
guessing their level of relative frequency judgements should approach the level of realism found 
for the confidence judgements. This predicted pattern was only partly replicated in the present 
study in the relative format. When participants didn’t receive an instruction to incorporate a 
correction for guessing before making a relative frequency judgement they made frequency 
judgements on a much lower level than the mean level of the confidence judgements. The 
participants who received an instruction to make a correction for guessing approached the same 
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level as the confidence judgements. This pattern is discernible from Figure 1 and Figure 2 on 
pages 33-34. 
       A significant difference in this study compared to Liberman’s study 2, is that he reported 
only 3 of 134 participants whose mean estimate were below 50 %, that is, chance level, in his 
unrestricted (no instruction to correct for guessing was given) condition where they were free to 
estimate their performance. In comparison, in the No correction for guessing/relative condition 
in this study, there were 10 of 28 participants on the set of easy questions whose estimate was 
below chance level and 12 of 28 participants made estimates below 50 % on the set of hard 
questions. Liberman reported that none of the participants in his study 2 and 3 gave estimates 
below 50 % after receiving the instruction to correct for guessing and in this study there was only 
one who did. Strangely enough, this instruction to make a correction for guessing with the 
normative reminder that a performance level of 50 % would be expected by chance alone could 
not completely eliminate estimates below 50 % in the absolute format. In the Correction for 
guessing/absolute condition there were 9 of 28 estimates below 50 % for the set of easy 
questions and 10 of 28 estimates below 50 % for the set of hard questions.  
       This pattern of results contradicts the notion given by Todd and Gigerenzer (2003) and 
Cosmides and Tooby (1996) that people are frequentists and make by far better estimates when 
asked to do so in natural numbers. A not very likely, but possible, explanation of this is that the 
participants in the Correction for guessing/absolute condition did not understand the 
instructions. This explanation is not very likely since their confidence judgements and accuracy 
on the set of easy questions were fairly realistic and well above chance level and their confidence 
judgements for the set of hard questions actually showed overconfidence while their accuracy was 
almost on chance level.  
       In short, the factor Instruction did have a significant main effect, even though the effect 
sizes were small for this factor, on the level of the frequency judgements. The results herein only 
lend partial support to Liberman’s suggestion that the often found good realism in frequency 
judgements is due to the normative failure that participants don’t include a correction for 
guessing when making a frequency estimate. This is so since in the absolute format the level of 
frequency judgements did not approach the level of realism as in the confidence judgements. 
 
Effects of the difficulty level of the questions  
The prediction of the fourth hypothesis that frequency judgements would be more realistic after 
the set of hard questions and show underconfidence after the set of easy questions was partially 
borne out in both formats when the participants were not asked to make a correction for 
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guessing. The mean frequency judgements were realistic for the set of hard questions with the 
exception that they showed overestimation in the Correction for guessing/relative condition. The 
results for the set of easy questions showed significant underestimation in all conditions. It seems 
that the results follow nicely from the dual process account when at the same time one takes the 
hard-easy effect into consideration. It is noteworthy that the effect sizes for this factor, the 
difficulty level of the questions, were in the range of medium to large.  
 
General discussion 
To reiterate, since there were no interaction effects and only simple main effects of all factors on 
the level of the frequency judgements and for their realism, the results suggest that the level of 
realism in the frequency judgements is affected by different processes when participants are asked 
to make these metacognitive judgements, but the effect sizes show that the effects of instruction 
and format were small and the effect sizes for difficulty level of the questions were of medium to 
large size.  
       In the large, the dual-support hypothesis seems to best accommodate the data in the present 
study with one notable exception, that the levels of the confidence and frequency judgements 
given in the Correction for guessing/relative condition were essentially the same. Thus, the 
results indicate that it could plausibly be that participants make reference to different parts of 
their memory systems and different processes are involved when making the two kinds of 
investigated metacognitive judgements. 
       Since the effect of Liberman’s instruction was only partially successful one must consider the 
possibility that there is some other factor or multiple factors involved which prevents the 
participants from making realistic frequency judgements in different conditions. Since I didn’t 
interview the participants nor ask them to make written protocols wherein they could have 
described how and on what pieces of information they made their estimates, I can only speculate 
about which type of heuristics they used or failed to use.  
       The results show that the participants did not necessarily give more realistic frequency 
judgements when asked to do so in natural numbers since the estimates for the set of easy 
questions show more underestimation than the corresponding relative frequency judgements. 
This also suggests that there are other explanations as to why people are miscalibrated than just 
assuming that people are “natural frequentists” and have more difficulty making estimates in 
terms of relative frequencies. One explanation could be that the recognition heuristic worked 
quite well for most of the participants in all conditions for the set of easy questions. These items 
could perhaps be part of most participants’ background knowledge as seen by their higher mean 
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level of accuracy. For the set of hard questions the items are obviously not to the same degree 
part of the participants general background knowledge (since the mean level of accuracy were 
much lower than for the set of easy questions) and therefore the participants might not have 
been able to recollect additional evidence for their chosen answer. If that was the case then they 
must rely more on the recognition heuristic or the familiarity of one answer alternative in order to 
choose an answer. This ignorance driven heuristic could have been involved for the set of hard 
questions since the results for actual accuracy were approximately on chance level in all 
conditions. 
       However, the design of this study was to investigate if the three factors studied had an effect 
on the level and the realism of the frequency judgements participants made. It was not designed 
to find out how or why these factors affected the frequency judgements. Furthermore the design 
did not aim to find out what type of reasoning procedures or processes the participants engage in 
when making confidence or frequency judgements. I propose that these matters should be seen 
as open empirical questions for subsequent research to investigate. Even though the results 
herein lend support to the conclusion that the three factors investigated has an effect, I suggest 
further replications (or partial replications) of this study. Since I have only been able to locate one 
previous study of the effect of instruction and none concerning the effect of using both an 
absolute or relative format when answering 2AFC GKQs, I especially recommend further 
exploration into these factors before one takes the effects of these factors as an established fact. 
The effects of the difficulty level of the questions have in comparison been quite thoroughly 
investigated. 
       Finally, to answer the question posed in the title which has guided most of the work 
presented in this paper, correction for guessing does improve realism in relative frequency 
judgements but only with respect to the set of easy questions. Correction for guessing for the set 
of hard questions had the effect that frequency judgements showed overestimation and no 
correction for guessing before relative frequency judgements showed almost perfect realism. 
       Correction for guessing using the absolute format improved realism slightly for the set of 
easy questions but for both levels of instruction the level of realism in frequency judgements 
showed significant underestimation. Correction for guessing using the absolute format did not 
make a significant difference on the set of hard questions in the absolute format since for both 
levels of instruction the frequency judgements only showed slight underestimation (they did not 
differ significantly from zero). In short, correction for guessing does only markedly improve the 
realism in relative frequency judgements on a set of easy questions. 
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Concluding remarks 
Most of the accounts briefly sketched in the beginning of this paper involve explanations of 
metacognitive judgements in terms of different cognitive and methodological factors. Taken 
together, none of them could fully explain the results in the present study. Considering that the 
overwhelming majority of the reported studies do not use any task that one could expect that 
most people perform in real life situations one would hope that this would come more into focus 
in future research.  
       The fact that people don’t always know what they claim to know has today become trivial. 
What is more interesting is how people come to trust someone as being knowledgeable. More 
specifically, on how many occasions does a person need to show that her/his estimates are fairly 
realistic before one concludes that s/he is trustworthy in a particular knowledge domain? Or 
should the question be posed differently? How many times can an expert fail to give realistic 
metacognitive judgements before s/he is degraded from the role of being an expert? A further 
complication of this matter is that people generally listen more to someone who seems to be 
confident in what they are saying than someone who does not express the same level of 
confidence. 
       Many previously reported studies have tried to explain why the hard-easy effect, the 
overconfidence phenomenon and the confidence-frequency effect occurs but not that many 
studies have tried to pinpoint the conditions under which people’s metacognitive judgements in 
every day life could be expected to show good realism and therefore could be trusted regardless 
of the level of confidence expressed in these judgements. This would be a very welcome addition 
to our present state of knowledge about these matters. 
       Finally, since this paper will receive a very limited distribution and probably only will be read 
by a few psychologists and soon to be psychologists I would like to mention that when Oskamp 
did research on clinical psychologists in 1965 (reported in Allwood & Granhag, 1999) it was 
found that they were overconfident in diagnosing and predicting future behaviour. My question 
is, can clinical psychologists be assumed to have become more realistic in their judgements since 
then, and if not, what, if anything, can be done to increase their level of realism? 
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Appendix A: The medical diagnosis problem 
 
The original presentation of this problem was made by Casscells, Schoenberger and Graboys in 
1978 (cited in Cosmides & Tooby, 1996) and replicated by Cosmides and Tooby (1996): 
 
       If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of 5 %, 
       what is the chance that a person found to have a positive result actually has the disease, 
       assuming that you know nothing about the person’s symptoms or signs? ____% (p. 23) 
 
Casscells et al. asked a group of faculty, staff and four-year students at Harvard Medical School to 
solve this problem (reported by Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). Only 18 % gave the correct answer, 
which is 2 %. A version of the same problem presented in a frequentist format is presented by 
Cosmides and Tooby (1996): 
 
       1 out of every 1000 Americans has disease X. A test has been developed to detect when a person has 
       disease X. Every time the test is given to a person who has the disease, the test comes out positive 
       (i.e., the “true positive” rate is 100 %). But sometimes the test also comes out positive when it is  
       given to a person who is completely healthy. Specifically, out of every 1000 people who are perfectly    
       healthy, 50 of them test positive for the disease (i.e., the “false positive” rate is 5 %). ( . . . ) 
       How many people who test positive for the disease will actually have the disease? __ out of __ (p. 24) 
 
When participants were given the information in this format, 76 % of them gave the correct 
answer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49
Appendix B: Instruction 
 
The following instruction from Varda Liberman’s (2004) article was translated into Swedish: 
 
        Logically your estimate should be at least 50 percent, because even people who make a     
       random guess for each and every answer would, on average, get 50 percent correct. And, 
       logically, if you knew the answer or had a good idea about the right answer on at least some  
       of the questions your estimate should be higher than 50 percent because you should get 
       more than 50 percent of those correct, plus (on average) half of the ones on which you just  
       made a guess. However it is possible to be unlucky in one’s guesses and to get less than 50  
       percent correct, and you are free to estimate less than 50 percent if you wish. What we want 
       is your best estimate about your own particular performance on the 36 questions. (p. 731) 
 
Note that the only thing I changed in the translation of this instruction was the number 36 to 40, 
since that was the number of questions in both of my sets of questions. 
